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In this note, we present a novel channel for a brain gain. Students from a developing country 
study in a developed host country. A higher permanent migration probability of these students 
appears to be a brain drain for the developing country in the first place. However, it induces 
the host country to improve its education quality, as a larger share of the generated benefits 
accrue in this host country. A higher education quality raises in turn the human capital of the 
returning students. As long as the permanent migration probability is not too large, this 
positive effect causes both aggregate and per-capita human capital to increase in the 
developing country. Thus, a brain gain occurs. 
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The recent literature on international migration emphasises that the mobility of
skilled workers can lead to a brain gain for developing countries. Empirical stud-
ies show that although substantial numbers of skilled workers have left developing
countries, human capital stocks in these countries may have increased (e.g., Beine et
al., 2008). Standard explanations for this outcome focus on the impact of mobility
on private investments in higher education. As skilled wages are higher in the rich
world, the prospect of emigrating to a developed country raises the expected private
returns to human capital even in remote and poor corners of the world. Therefore,
more natives of developing countries invest in their education. Despite the tempta-
tions of the rich world, many students from developing countries end up staying
in, or returning to, their home country. Consequently, developing countries enjoy a
brain gain if the private incentive e⁄ect is su¢ ciently strong (e.g., Mountford, 1997;
Stark et al., 1997, 1998; Vidal, 1998; Beine et al., 2001; Stark and Wang, 2002; Mayr
and Peri, 2009; Eggert et al., 2010).
This paper suggests a fundamentally di⁄erent channel through which a brain
gain can result. In contrast to the existing literature, we focus on the impact of
mobility on the education policy of a rich host country where natives of a developing
country study. The rich host country can bene￿t from these foreign students not
only because they pay tuition fees, but also because, if they continue to reside in the
host country upon graduation, their human capital exhibits a positive externality.
We analyse speci￿cally the implications of an increase in the permanent migra-
tion probability (i.e., the probability that a student from a developing country stays
and works in a rich host country after graduation). This increase may result from
technological developments, such as better communication and transportation tech-
nologies. These developments allow expatriates to keep in touch with family and
friends left behind more easily and at lower costs, and thus softens the downside of
permanent migration. Also, permanent migration may increase because of institu-
tional and political changes, such as more liberal immigration laws and measures
1to promote access to the host country￿ s labour market (e.g., Chalo⁄ and Lemaitre,
2009).
No matter what the causes are, an increase in the permanent migration probab-
ility makes it more attractive for the host country to invest in education quality, as
a larger bene￿t from the human capital externality accrues to the host country. A
higher education quality, in turn, boosts the human capital of all students, including
those who ultimately return to the developing country. As a result of this quality
e⁄ect, aggregate human capital in the developing country increases with the per-
manent migration probability as long as this probability is not too large. Once the
permanent migration probability exceeds a critical level, however, a further increase
depresses aggregate human capital in the developing country.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in the next section, we present
our model. Section 3 characterises the optimal education policy of the rich country,
and analyses how this optimal policy responds to an increase in the permanent
migration probability. In section 4, we present our key conclusion on brain gain and
brain drain. Section 5 summarises our results.
2 The Model
There are two countries, Poor P and Rich R. Rich hosts a university, called the
University of Rich (UoR). The government of Rich controls, directly or indirectly,
the quality of education q, q ￿ 0, and tuition fee t. An improvement in education
quality increases both variable costs per student c(q) = ￿q and ￿xed costs F(q),
with F(0) = 0, F 0(q) ￿ 0 and F 00(q) > 0. The elasticity of marginal ￿xed costs with
respect to quality (i.e., " := F 00q=F 0) is constant; a case in point is a quadratic cost
function.
There is no university in Poor; however, UoR is open to natives of Poor. Those
individuals from Poor who enrol and study at UoR stay on and work in Rich after
graduation with probability m, m 2 [0;1], and return to and work in Poor with
probability (1 ￿ m). The returning individuals are randomly drawn from the set of
2Poor￿ s natives who have graduated at UoR. We refer to m as permanent migration
probability.
If individual k studies at UoR, she acquires human capital akq and, upon gradu-
ation, earns wage wk(q) = akq. That is, individual human capital akq and wage
wk increase with k￿ s innate ability, denoted by ak, and the quality of her university
education q. Individuals di⁄er in their ability ak, ak 2 [0;1], and ability is uniformly
distributed across Poor￿ s population, whose size is normalised to one. Importantly,
human capital akq exhibits a positive externality bakq, b > 0, in the country where,
after graduation, individual k resides and works. If an individual does not study
at UoR, she does not acquire human capital and receives only a basic wage. For
convenience, we set the basic wage to zero.
The timing of decisions is as follows: Rich chooses its education quality q in the
￿rst stage and its tuition fee t in the second stage. It maximises the expected human
capital externality accruing to Rich and the net ￿nancial contributions of foreign
students (i.e., aggregate tuition fees minus education costs), as detailed in objective
function (3) below. In the third stage, the natives of Poor decide whether they
study at UoR or whether they do not. They maximise their disposable income, i.e.,
wage income minus tuition fee. All other actions occur ￿ automatically￿ . Students
complete their education. They continue to stay in Rich with permanent migration
probability m or return to Poor with probability (1 ￿ m). Graduate k earns wage
wk(q) and causes externality bakq in her ￿nal country of residence. To state our
key conclusion as sharply as possible, we ignore students from Rich in our analysis.
Hence, fee t is to be interpreted as the tuition fee levied on foreign students.
3 Education and Permanent Migration
In the third stage, each native of Poor decides whether she studies at UoR, which
yields disposable income wk(q) ￿ t = akq ￿ t, or stays at home, which leads to






￿nd it bene￿cial to study abroad and pay tuition fees. They can convert education
quality q into a higher wage aq very e⁄ectively, and thus at least recoup the initial
private education costs.








(1 ￿ ^ a
2). (2)
In the second stage, Rich chooses its tuition fee t. It maximises the net contri-
bution of foreign students to the welfare of Rich:
WR = bmAq | {z }
externality
+ (1 ￿ ^ a)t
| {z }
tuition fees




The ￿rst term on the RHS captures the positive externality of the foreign students
who continue to stay in Rich. This externality increases with aggregate human
capital Aq, permanent migration probability m and externality parameter b. The
second and third term show aggregate tuition fees and education costs, respectively.
The sum of these two terms captures the net ￿nancial contribution, or burden, of
foreign students to Rich.
A higher tuition fee per student has ambiguous e⁄ects on aggregate tuition fees,
as the payment per student goes up while the number of students falls. Moreover,
the decline in the number of students in response to a higher fee reduces the hu-
man capital externality and aggregate education costs. Balancing the positive and










which follow directly from the ￿rst-order condition @WR=@t = 0 in combination with
4(1) and (2).1 To avoid tedious discussions of boundary solutions, we assume that
￿ 2 [0;1) holds. Then an interior solution ^ a￿ 2 (0;1) is guaranteed for all m 2 [0;1]
and b > 0 (see (4)).
In the ￿rst stage, Rich chooses the optimal education quality q￿. Inserting tuition
fee (4) into objective function (3) and maximising the resulting expression with
respect to q yields the ￿rst-order condition
@WR
@q









On the one hand, a higher education quality boosts the human capital externality
in Rich and enables the government of Rich to raise the tuition fee (￿rst and second
term of the derivative). On the other hand, it increases both variable and ￿xed costs
(third and fourth term). In the optimum, the government balances the marginal
bene￿ts and marginal costs of improving the quality of education.
Both education quality and enrolment depend on the permanent migration prob-
ability. These relationships are summarised in the following lemma.
Lemma The quality of education at UoR and the number of Poor natives who study
at UoR increase with the permanent migration probability. That is, dq￿=dm > 0 and
d^ a￿=dm < 0.
Proof. Using (2) and (4) to rearrange (5) yields
@WR
@q
= (1 + ￿)
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@q2 < 0, (7)
where we used (5) to evaluate @2WR=(@q@m) at the optimal quality level q￿. Using
1In this paper, all second-order conditions are ful￿lled.
















1 + ^ a￿
1 ￿ ^ a￿^ a
￿ @F=@q
@2F=@q2 > 0. (8)
Finally, d^ a￿=dm < 0 follows directly from (4).
The intuition for these results is straightforward. Human capital causes a positive
externality in the country where the graduates who have acquired human capital
￿nally reside. An increase in the probability of permanent migration m means that
a larger share of this positive externality accrues in Rich. Consequently, the bene￿ts
to Rich of both educating more foreign students and providing a higher education
quality increase. Rich invests more in education and o⁄ers a higher quality q￿.2 Also,
Rich lowers the quality-adjusted tuition fee t￿=q￿ to attract more foreign students.3
Hence the number of Poor students at UoR (1 ￿ ^ a￿) grows.
The incentive to align education quality and tuition fee to a higher permanent
migration probability of foreign students might be particularly strong in host coun-
tries for which student migration is an important channel for recruiting high-skilled
workers. A case in point is Australia, where international students make up nearly
20% of total tertiary enrolments in 2007 (OECD, 2009, p. 308), and where about
20% of all high-skilled immigrants in 2005-2006 had indeed initially come to Aus-
tralia as foreign students and then continued to stay there as skilled workers after
their graduation (Chalo⁄ and Lemaitre, 2009, p. 25).4
2This result is not an artifact of the simple market structure. Haupt et al. (2010) ￿nd a similar
e⁄ect in a model where two potential host countries compete for talented students from a third
country. In contrast to the current paper, Haupt et al. (2010) focuses on the welfare in the host
countries and the potential ine¢ ciency of international competition.
3Tuition fee t can fall or rise. More precisely, we can show that dt￿=dm R 0 , 1=" R
(1 ￿ ^ a￿)=(1 + ^ a￿), where " is the elasticity of marginal ￿xed costs, as de￿ned above.
4In many programmes in English speaking countries, particularly at the postgraduate level,
foreign students constitute the overwhelming majority of participants. Furthermore, universities
speci￿cally invest in the quality of the education that foreign students receive by setting up support
programmes. Measures include, for instance, tutorials for students from speci￿c countries and
transition courses to bridge the gap between the education system of the students￿home country
and of their host country. Many countries, particularly those outside the English speaking world,
have set up speci￿c international programmes in English geared towards the needs of foreign
students. Thus, the presence of international students indeed shapes educational decisions, such
as the choice of education quality.
64 Brain Drain or Brain Gain?
We can now analyse whether a rise in the permanent migration probability causes
a brain gain or brain drain. In this context, we de￿ne brain gain (brain drain) as
an increase (decrease) in the aggregate human capital stock in Poor after return
migration has taken place. Recall that only those Poor citizens who study at UoR
build up human capital. Thus, the human capital stock in Poor is given by
HCP = (1 ￿ m)Aq
￿. (9)
Then, the impact of a marginal increase in the permanent migration probability m
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This derivative shows three di⁄erent e⁄ects of a higher permanent migration prob-
ability m on aggregate human capital in Poor. The ￿rst term captures that a higher
probability m means less return migration, and thus a lower human capital stock in
Poor. The second term re￿ ects that, in response to the changes in education policy,
more individuals from Poor study at UoR. This e⁄ect increases human capital in
Poor, as some student migrants return. Finally, the third term captures the positive
e⁄ect of the permanent migration probability on the quality of education in Rich,
and thus on the human capital of return migrants.
We can now state our key result in the following proposition.
Proposition Human Capital in Poor after Return Migration.
Suppose that externality b is su¢ ciently large. Then, human capital HCP increases
(decreases) with permanent migration probability m if and only if probability m is
below (strictly above) a unique threshold level e m 2 (0;1). That is,
dHCP
dm
Q 0 , m R e m. (11)
7Proof. First, we evaluate derivative (10) at the maximum permanent migration
probability m = 1, which yields dHCP=dmjm=1 = ￿Aq￿ < 0.
Second, we evaluate derivative (10) at the minimum permanent migration prob-
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Since @G(0;￿;b)=@￿ > 0, G(0;￿;b) reaches its minimum for ￿ = 0 (recall that


















That is, if b > 6=(2 + 9="), then G(0;￿;b) > 0, and thus dHCL=dmjm=0 > 0, for
all ￿.
Third, @2HCP=@m2 < 0 follows from di⁄erentiating (12).
Since @2HCP=@m2 < 0, dHCP=dmjm=1 < 0 and, for b > 6=(2 + 9="),
dHCP=dmjm=0 > 0 for all ￿, the intermediate value theorem implies that, for
b > 6=(2 + 9="), there exists a unique e m 2 (0;1) : dHCP=dm Q 0 , m R e m for all
￿.
This proposition establishes a non-monotonic relationship between the human
capital stock in Poor and the permanent migration probability. An increase in
the permanent migration probability indeed causes a brain gain, but only if this
probability is not too large. Once the permanent migration probability exceeds a
critical level, a further rise has the opposite e⁄ect and leads to a brain drain. Let
us explore the intuition for this conclusion.
8From the perspective of Poor, there is a quantity-quality trade-o⁄. If the per-
manent migration probability is low (i.e., m < e m), many students return from Rich
to Poor upon graduation, but their human capital is rather low. In this situation,
Poor can bene￿t from stronger incentives for Rich to improve the quality of educa-
tion, and an increase in the permanent migration probability makes it indeed more
attractive for Rich to invest in its education quality. The resulting increase in the
human capital of returning students more than compensates Poor for the loss of
skilled workers due to less return migration. Overall, an increase in the permanent
migration probability m leads to a brain gain.
By contrast, if the permanent migration probability is high (i.e., m ￿ e m), the
host country already provides a high education quality. Thus, the acquired human
capital of the students who return from Rich is also already large, and Poor cannot
bene￿t that much from a further increase in the education quality abroad. Instead,
the human capital stock in Poor will su⁄er substantially if even fewer students
return. Under these circumstances, a further increase in the permanent migration
probability m causes a brain drain.5
To understand the novelty of this result, recall that a change in probability m has
no direct e⁄ect on the decisions of the students. For a given education policy (t;q),
variations in m have no impact on the students￿incentives to acquire education and
study abroad, and thus leave threshold (1) unaltered. The probability of permanent
migration a⁄ects human capital only via its impact on the education policy of Rich.
This mechanism distinguishes our paper from the previous literature (for instance,
Stark et al., 1997, 1998).
We could have considered average human capital in Poor instead of aggregate
human capital, with no changes to our conclusions. If a higher permanent migration
probability leads to a greater (smaller) aggregate human capital stock in Poor, then
5This non-monotonous welfare e⁄ect is somewhat reminiscent of Haupt and Janeba (2009).
They analyse changes in the education and redistribution policy of a relatively poor country when
the threat of skilled emigration grows, i.e., when migration costs fall. Starting from high migration
costs, a decline in migration costs initially raises welfare in Poor while, once migration costs are
below a critical level, a further fall in migration costs decreases welfare.
9it also leads to a higher (smaller) human capital per capita. However, there is one
quali￿cation to be made. A brain gain can only arise if the human capital externality
b is su¢ ciently strong. Otherwise, Rich cannot signi￿cantly bene￿t from permanent
migration, and has no incentive to su¢ ciently enhance its education quality, as
probability m increases. Consequently, Poor cannot su¢ ciently bene￿t from better
educated students who return from Rich. Formally, e m = 0 would result in this case.6
5 Summary
This note presents a novel channel for brain gain. Considering individuals from a
developing country who study in a rich host country, we argue that a higher perman-
ent migration probability induces the host country to improve its education quality.
A higher education quality raises the human capital of the students returning to the
developing country. As long as the permanent migration probability is not too large,
this positive quality e⁄ect increases both aggregate and per capita human capital
in the developing country. This mechanism is novel because the brain gain is not
driven by private incentives for Poor￿ s population to acquire human capital, but by
incentives for the rich country to change its education policy.
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